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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:
:

v.
HEATHER JO RODRIGUEZ,

:

Case No. 20040566-SC

Defendant/Respondent.

:

Respondent is not incarcerated.

INTRODUCTION
On June 20, 2005, Heather Jo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) filed her Brief of
Respondent on Certiorari Review addressing the only issue on which the State requested
certiorari review: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, created
an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from
respondent." Order dated Oct. 18, 2004; see Rspt. Br. at 14-29; see Addendum A. Oral
argument for this issue was held on December 5, 2005. On September 6, 2006, this Court
issued an order asking the parties to "supplement their briefing to address" the following
issue: "[W]hether the court of appeals properly held that the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from Ms. Rodriguez did not
justify the warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution." Order dated Sept. 6, 2006; see Addendum B.
This Court should not consider the supplemental issue outlined in its September 6,
2006, order because the State did not ask this Court to consider the issue in its petition for

a writ of certiorari. See infra at Part I. Regardless, this Court should affirm the Utah
Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, 93 P.3d 854, cert.
granted, 100 P.3d 220 (Utah 2004), because the court of appeals properly held the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from
Rodriguez did not justify the warrantless search under the exigent circumstances
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.1 See infra at Part II.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS'
APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
TEST IN RODRIGUEZ'S CASE BECAUSE THIS ISSUE WAS NOT
FAIRLY INCLUDED IN THE STATE'S PETITION FOR A WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

"Review on certiorari is limited to examining the court of appeals' decision and is
further circumscribed by the issues raised in the petition[]." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v.
Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); see Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(a) (2002) (granting this Court jurisdiction over decisions of court of appeals); DeBry
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995) (stating issues not raised in petition for
certiorari are not properly before the court); Sew v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 637

This Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the following issue:
"[W]hether the court of appeals properly held that the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from Ms. Rodriguez did not
justify the warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution." Order dated Sept. 6, 2006. Defense counsel understands this issue to
encompass only the court of appeals' application of the totality of the circumstances test
to the facts of Rodriguez's case to determine exigent circumstances did not justify the
warrantless blood draw. If this Court understands the issue more broadly, then defense
counsel requests the opportunity for additional briefing.
2

(Utah 1995). The "statement of a question presented [for certiorari review] will be
deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein," and "[o]nly the
questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the
Supreme Court.55 Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4).
In its petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, the State asked this Court to
review one issue: "Did the court of appeals err55 by rejecting the State's argument that
"the evanescence of blood alcohol evidence alone creates an exigency that, coupled with
probable cause, justifies a warrantless blood draw?55 Cert. Pt. at 1. The State's focus on
this issue in its statement of the question presented for review and throughout its petition
made clear it had one purpose in seeking a writ of certiorari—to convince this Court to
ignore its long tradition of applying the totality of the circumstances test to determine
exigency and instead adopt a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases. IcL 1, 5-11. This one
purpose is clearly and narrowly described in the State's petition and cannot be said to
fairly include the entirely separate issue of whether, if this Court declines to adopt a per
se rule of exigency, the court of appeals properly held the totality of the circumstances in
this case did not justify the warrantless extraction of Rodriguez's blood. Id; Utah R.
App. P. 49(a)(4) (limiting review on certiorari to "subsidiary question[s] fairly included"
in "question presented" for review).
Thus, this Court should limit its consideration of this case to the only issue
properly presented for certiorari review: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood,
without more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a
3

blood sample from respondent." Order dated Oct. 18, 2004. Moreover, this Court should
affirm because the court of appeals correctly declined to create a per se rule of exigency
that would justify blood draws in all DUI cases, regardless of the time and means
available to officers to seek a warrant. See Rspt. Br. at 14-29.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS'
DECISION BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY
HELD THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW DID NOT
JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH UNDER THE EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT'S WARRANT REQUIREMENT

"'[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless
"the exigencies of the situation" make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that
the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'5'
Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006) (Stuart ID (citation omitted).
Exigent circumstances are "'those "that would cause a reasonable person to believe that
[immediate] entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other
persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.'"" Brigham City
v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13,1[18, 122 P.3d 506 (Stuart I) (citations omitted), rev'd by Stuart II,
126 S.Ct 1943.2

In Stuart II, the Supreme Court reversed the result this Court reached by applying the
totality of the circumstances test to the facts of Stuart's case. Stuart II, 126 S.Ct. at 1949.
The Supreme Court, however, did not address this Court's decision to apply the totality
of the circumstances test rather than adopting a per se rule of exigency in domestic
4

"[EJxigency does not evolve from one individual fact." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); see Rodriguez, 2004 UTApp 198 at 1(15. "Instead, there is
often a mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself sufficient." Id. Thus, the
determination of whether exigency exists "is based on the totality of the circumstances."
City of Oremv. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see, e.g., Stuart II
126 S.Ct. at 1947 (applying totality of circumstances test to determine whether
warrantless home entry was justified by exigency). The totality of the circumstances test
is a "flexible, common sense" test. State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105,Tf27, 104 P.3d 1265. A
reviewing court's '"task is to review the totality of facts and circumstances of the
particular case to determine if the finding of exigency was proper.'" Henrie, 868 P.2d at
1388 (quoting Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258); see Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at Tfl5.
In determining whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search,
appellate courts look closely at "the time available for the officers to have obtained a
search warrant once [events] triggered the existence of probable cause and immediate
exigency." Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1266; see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71
(1966) (holding, in case where federal law did not yet permit telephonic warrants,
exigency existed to justify warrantless blood draw because "there was no time to seek out

violence cases, or the reasons it gave for making this decision. Id. at 1947-49. Thus, this
Court's strong renunciation of per se rules to determine exigency remains good law. Id.;
Stuart I, 2005 UT 13 atffi[40,43-44. In fact, in Stuart II, the Supreme Court, like this
Court, applied the totality of the circumstances test, despite the presence of domestic
violence, to determine whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless home
entry. Stuart II, 126 S.Ct. at 1949.
5

a magistrate and secure a warrant"); United States v. Talkingtom 843 F.2d 1041, 1046
(7th Cir. 1988) (remanding because record did not tell "length of time that elapsed from
Agent[5s] [] first observation of the fire until the agents stormed [defendant's] home/' so
appellate court could not determine "whether it was possible to obtain a telephonic
warrant under the circumstances"); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990)
("The amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant by traditional means has always been
considered in determining whether circumstances are exigent.").
For example, in United States v. Patino, 830 F.2d 1413 (7th Cir. 1987), an agent
"observed [perpetrator] outside [defendant's] apartment-house" and "called for backup
assistance to make the arrest because he thought that [perpetrator] might be armed." Id.
at 1416. The backup agents "were at the time thirty minutes away." Id "The agent at
the scene waited for reinforcements before making any attempt to enter [defendant's]
home in search of [perpetrator]." Id. "Inexplicably, during that thirty-minute period he
did not attempt to arrange for a telephonic search warrant." IcL On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit held that this "[o]ne fact alone demonstrate^] the lack of exigent circumstances
and the consequent unreasonableness of the entry of [defendant's] residence without a
search warrant." Id
Similarly, in United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1987), where "the
defendant drug dealer [] indicated he would wait in his hotel room for about thirty
minutes for the undercover agent to return with the cash and there was no indication he

6

suspected that he was being set up," the Seventh Circuit found there was "no emergency
justifying a warrantless search" and "noted that under these facts, seeking a telephonic
search warrant would have been an appropriate course of action." Patino, 803 F.2d at
1416 (citing Diaz, 814 F.2d at 456, 457, 458-59).
Conversely, in Ashe, this Court held that officers investigating a drug sale
transaction did not have "the time required to obtain a telephone warrant" because "there
was no delay on behalf of the officers," and "no delay beyond those few minutes required
by the officers to arrest the conspirators and drive to [the defendant's] house could be
considered safe." Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1267-68. Similarly, in Henrie, the defendant fled the
scene of a car accident, drove home, and retreated to her apartment. Henrie, 868 P.2d at
1385-86. Although "the police could have sought a telephonic warrant," the court of
appeals found the failure to get a telephonic warrant did not preclude the existence of
exigent circumstances because "the officers were engaged in a continuous and ongoing
search for defendant, who had left the scene of an accident moments earlier." Id. at 1393
(citation omitted).
In this case, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals properly held
the totality of the circumstances did not justify the warrantless blood draw under the
exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
Below, the trial court held exigency existed based entirely on one circumstance—"the
dissipation of alcohol in the blood." R. 309; see Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^[17.
Following this Court's and the Supreme Court's long tradition of applying the totality of
7

the circumstances test, rather than a per se rule, to determine whether exigency justified a
warrantless search, the court of appeals concluded the trial court's holding was error.
RodrigvraL,2004UT App 19& ^<H\4-\5; res,IfateAStates v. Banks, S4QU.S. 1 1 , %
(2003) (noting Fourth Amendment analysis has "largely avoid[ed] categories and
protocols for searches" because it is "too hard to invent categories without giving short
shrift to details that turn out to be important in a given instance, and without inflating
marginal ones" (citation omitted)); Pennsvlvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977)
(noting "touchstone" of Fourth Amendment analysis "is always 'the reasonableness in all
the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal
security'" (citation omitted)); Stuart I, 2005 UT 13 at 1fl[40-4l, 4 3 " 4 4 (declining to adopt
per se rule of exigency for domestic violence cases, despite "unquestioned evils of
domestic violence," because "categorical extension would unduly threaten the special
protection the Fourth Amendment bestows on people").
Rather than creating a per se rule that "the dissipation of alcohol in the blood is
sufficient to create an exigent circumstance," R. 309, the trial court should have analyzed
the totality of the circumstances unique to Rodriguez's case. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT
App 198 at TU
| 14-15. Only an analysis of all the facts and circumstances would have
allowed the trial court to accurately determine whether "a reasonable person" would have
"believe[d] that [immediate] entry . . . was necessary to prevent... the destruction of
relevant evidence." Stuart I, 2005 UT 13 at ^[18 (quotations and citation omitted) (second
alteration in original); see Stuart II, 126 S.Ct. at 1949 (applying totality of circumstances
8

test to determine whether exigent circumstances justified warrantless home entry); Welsh
v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (holding, where "only potential emergency" was
officers' need to preserve suspect's blood-alcohol level, insufficient exigency to justify
home entry because gravity of underlying offense for which arrest was made was "an
additional important factor to be considered"); Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^[14-15.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in the record and the
trial court's findings of fact, the court of appeals then correctly determined exigency did
not justify the warrantless blood draw. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 atffi[15,17-20
(citing Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,^(19-20, 52 P.3d 1158) (other citations omitted).
The record shows two officers had the time and means to seek a warrant: Officer Larsen,
who supervised the investigation of the scene and ordered the blood draw, and Officer
Swensen, who was dispatched to witness the blood draw. See Rspt. Br. at 6-9 (referring
to Officer Larsen as "supervising officer").
First, Officer Larsen was dispatched to the scene approximately five minutes after
the accident occurred. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at P ; R. 560:17. When he arrived,
medical personnel had already treated Rodriguez and Stewart and transported them to the
hospital, and officers at the scene h^cTalready gathered the State's evidence. Rodriguez,
2004 UT App 198 atffi[2-3;R. 560:3-7, 12-17. With the bulk of the investigation
complete, Larsen had only to decide whether he believed a blood draw was necessary and
to dispatch an officer to witness the blood draw, which he did within twenty-five minutes

9

of the accident.3 Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at1f3; R. 560:14-16, 19.
After dispatching Officer Swensen to witness the blood draw, the record shows
Larsen had ample time and means to seek a warrant. The accident occurred a short
distance from the courthouse and at a time when the courthouse was open and warrants
could be readily requested. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^[19; R. 286; 560:3, 8;
compare State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding failure to
obtain telephonic warrant did not destroy exigency because "nearest pay phone was
located two hours away and radio contact was not viable"). More important, unlike the
officers in Schmerber, Larsen did not have to find time to travel to the courthouse
because he could have applied for a telephonic warrant from the scene of the accident.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) (1999) (statute authorizing officers to obtain warrant
by telephone); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71; United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 5152 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining the amendment to rule 41(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure that authorized telephonic search warrants did not become effective

3

Presumably, Larsen believed he had probable cause to draw Rodriguez's blood at the
point he dispatched Officer Swensen to witness the blood draw. It is questionable
whether Larsen made an actual probable cause determination based on the evidence
relayed to him at the scene, or whether he simply decided to draw Rodriguez's blood
because, as explained by Swensen, blood draws are "just as we do in accidents." R.
560:24, 54. Although Rodriguez disputes the existence of probable cause to justify the
blood draw, Larsen acted as if he believed there was probable cause when he dispatched
Swensen to witness the blood draw. Since the record demonstrates little, if any,
additional evidence supporting probable cause, it is from that point that this Court should
determine whether exigency existed. See Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1266 (holding appellate
courts, when determining whether exigency justified a warrantless search, look closely at
"time available for the officers to have obtained a search warrant once" events "triggered
the existence of probable cause and immediate exigency").
10

until August 1, 1977); State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
("[RJecognizing the delay that is often incurred in procuring a warrant, Utah has allowed
for issuance of a search warrant based on a sworn telephonic statement of the officer
seeking the warrant." (citation omitted)).
Further, unlike the circumstances in Schmerber, Ashe, and Henrie, at the time
Larsen decided a blood draw was necessary, he was not engaged in an ongoing and
continuous investigation that prevented him from seeking a warrant. See Schmerber, 384
U.S. at 770-71; Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1267-68; Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1393. Rather, the record
shows the investigation was largely complete, any evidence that remained to be gathered
was being gathered by other officers, and the injured had already been cared for and
transported to hospitals. R. 560:3-8, 12-17. In fact, Larsen was not even hampered by
the need to write a police report. R. 560:14. Finally, similar to Patino, and Diaz, there
was no emergency inherent to the investigation itself that prevented Larsen from seeking
a warrant because he knew it would take time for the dispatched officer and the blood
draw technician to travel to the hospital, locate the driver of the vehicle, and prepare for
the blood draw. R. 560:12-17; compare Patino, 830 F.2d at 1416; Diaz, 814 F.2d at 456,
457, 458-59 with Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1267-68.
Second, Officer Swensen was dispatched to witness the blood draw approximately
twenty-five minutes after the accident. R. 560:19, 50. He initially went to the wrong
hospital. R. 560:19-21, 50. When he arrived at the correct hospital, he questioned
Rodriguez briefly about her name. R. 560:23, 52. He then "just st[ood] there waiting"
11

for twenty to twenty-five minutes for the blood technician to arrive. R. 560:53.
Like Larsen, Swensen had the time and means to seek a warrant,4 Swensen was
only a short distance from the courthouse, he had access to a telephone throughout the
investigation, and the accident occurred at a time when the courthouse was open and
warrants could be readily requested in person or by telephone. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT
App 198 at 1119; R. 286; 560:3, 8; see Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) (1999) (statute
permitting officers to obtain warrant by telephone); compare Morck, 821 P.2d at 1194
(holding failure to obtain telephonic warrant did not destroy exigency because nearest
pay phone was "two hours away and radio contact was not viable").
Specifically, the record shows Swensen could have called for a warrant from the
moment he was dispatched to witness the blood draw. He could have called while he was
driving to the hospital, especially considering the additional time he took driving to the
wrong hospital. R. 560:19-21, 50-51. He also could have called after he arrived at the
hospital—during the time he was "just standing there waiting" for twenty to twenty-five

As explained in footnote 3, probable cause, if it arose at all, likely arose at the time
Larsen dispatched Swensen to witness the blood draw. See supra at note 3. Swensen
testified that when he witnessed the blood draw he did not suspect a crime had been
committed and knew only that he "was to witness a blood draw because of the traffic
accident." R. 560:56. Accordingly, Swensen did not conduct any investigation at the
hospital that could have meaningfully assisted in establishing probable cause. The record
shows his entire investigation of Rodriguez involved determining she was being
"uncooperative" and "belligerent" with the hospital staff, and asking her for her name,
which was ultimately unhelpful since Swensen did not know the name of the person he
was looking for. R. 560:22-23, 51-53. Regardless, if probable cause somehow arose at
the time Swensen found and questioned Rodriguez, then both Swensen and Larsen still
had time to obtain a warrant while they waited twenty-five minutes for the blood
technician to arrive. R. 560:53.
12

minutes for the blood technician to arrive. R. 560:53; see Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1268
(suggesting warrant not required because officers could not have "waited even an
additional twenty or thirty minutes to obtain a telephone search warrant"); Patino, 830
F.2d at 1416 (holding fact that officer waited for backup agents who were thirty minutes
away but did not seek warrant "alone demonstrate^] the lack of exigent circumstances");
Diaz, 814 F.2d at 456-59 (holding no exigency where defendant drug dealer indicated he
would wait thirty minutes for undercover agent to return).
Further, no emergency inherent to the investigation itself prevented Swensen from
seeking a warrant. He was not interrogating Rodriguez during the twenty-five minute
break in the investigation and he was not guarding Rodriguez because Rodriguez was
"receiving medical treatment" and the hospital personnel, not Swensen, prevented
Rodriguez from leaving the hospital. R. 560:53, 57; compare Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1267-68
(holding officers investigating drug transaction did not have "time required to obtain a
telephone warrant" because "there was no delay on behalf of the officers," and "no delay
beyond those few minutes required by the officers to arrest the conspirators and drive to
[defendant's] house could be considered safe").
In other words, the record shows two officers had the time and means to seek a
warrant but neither chose to do so. R. 560:15, 24, 53-54. There is nothing in the record
to suggest the circumstances of the situation prevented the officers from seeking a
warrant. Id. Rather, the officers' testimony suggests they simply overlooked the warrant
requirement in favor of the Salt Lake City Police Department policy that blood draws are
13

"a matter of routine" and do not require warrants. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at l(fl[1920; see State v. Flannigan, 978 P.2d 127, 132 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) ("The officers' rote
application of the department's untenable policy that exigent circumstances always exist
in vehicular manslaughter and aggravated assault cases violated [defendant's] right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure."). Specifically, when asked whether he made
any attempt to obtain a warrant, Larsen responded, "No," he just "sent an officer over and
had the blood draw done." R. 560:14-16. Similarly, Swensen testified he did not suspect
a crime had been committed, but knew only that he "was to witness a blood draw because
of the traffic accident." R. 560:56. He then told Rodriguez that the blood technician was
"going to draw blood from her just as we do in accidents." R. 560:24, 54.
In sum, the record shows both officers had the time and means to obtain a warrant,
but neither officer even attempted to begin the warrant process. Flannigan, 978 P.2d at
131 (holding no exigency in blood draw case where police did not even try to obtain a
warrant because "mere possibility of delay does not give rise to an exigency"). Such
actions undermine the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, which is '"basic to
a free society,5" Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (citation omitted), and not to be "lightly
disregarded." State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97,Tf22, 57 P.3d 1052 (noting "'warrant
requirement is an important check upon the power of the State to subject individuals to
unreasonable searches and seizures'" (citation omitted)). Thus, this Court should affirm
because the court of appeals correctly held the record did not demonstrate exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw.
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CONCLUSION
Rodriguez requests this Court to affirm the court of appeals' decision in State v.
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198.
SUBMITTED this [O

day of October, 2006.

fZZ&/4rr<>
LCWTSEPPt
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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State of Utah,
Petitioner,

Case No. 20040566-SC

v.

H e a t h e r Jo Rodriguez,
Respondent.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on July 7, 2004.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issue:
Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without
more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless
extraction of a blood sample from respondent.
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Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230

Deputy Clerk
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State of Utah,

No. 20040566

Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
Heather Jo Rodriguez,
Defendant and Respondent.
ORDER
The Court has concluded that it improvidently omitted from
its order granting certiorari review the question of whether the
court of appeals properly held that the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the warrantless extraction of a blood
sample from Ms. Rodriguez did not justify the warrantless search
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Accordingly, the Court invites the parties to supplement
their briefing to address this issue. Initial supplemental
briefs of appellant and appellee shall be filed no later than
October 6, 2006. Reply briefs shall be filed no later than
October 23, 2006. The Court does not expect additional oral
argument.
/ )^l

Dated this (P

day of September, 2006.
BY THE COURT

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice
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